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This chapter discusses some of the conceptual issues surrounding the
use of agent-based modelling in archaeology. Specifically, it addresses three
questions: Why use agent-based simulation? Does specifically agent-based
simulation imply a particular view of the world? How do we learn by sim-
ulating? First, however, it will be useful to provide a brief introduction to
agent-based simulation and how it relates to archaeological simulation more
generally. Some readers may prefer to return to this chapter after having
read a more detailed account of an exemplar (chapter 2) or of the soft-
ware technology (chapter 4). Textbooks on agent-based modelling include
Grimm and Railsback 2005 and Railsback and Grimm 2012, both aimed at
ecologists, the rather briefer Gilbert 2008, aimed at sociologists, and Ferber
1999, which treats agent-based simulation from the perspective of artificial
intelligence and computer science.
1 Agent-based modelling in archaeology
Agent-based modelling (ABM) is a method of computer simulation that is
particularly well suited to exploring how the aggregate characteristics of
some system arise from the behaviour of its parts. The parts in question
are modelled as ‘agents’, that is, units which have causal efficacy and can
reasonably be treated as individuals in the sense that they act as cohesive
wholes in respect of the particular research problem. Agents are usually
situated in an artificial environment and their behaviour is governed by
rules which specify how they respond to the content of that environment
and possibly also the behaviour of other agents (Epstein and Axtell 1996,
p.5).
The well known Long House Valley agent-based model (chapter 2; Dean
et al. 2000; Axtell et al. 2002; also Kohler et al. 2005 for a popular ac-
count) illustrates the paradigmatic features of a typical agent-based model.
The Long House Valley ABM was built to explore the relationship between
climatically determined resource availability, settlement location and popu-
lation growth in Long House Valley, Arizona in the period A.D. 400–1450. In
this example the agents are individual Puebloan households, each of which
use rules to choose where to settle in Long House Valley in order to grow
sufficient maize to survive. The maize-growing potential for each hectare in
the valley was inferred from painstaking palaeoenvironmental research and
is input into the model for every year from A.D. 400 to 1450. When the
simulation is run, growth of a household and/or environmental degradation
can lead to fissioning or wholesale relocation of that settlement. In this way,
repeated individual household decision-making and reproduction produces a
changing macro-level settlement pattern and population size, both of which
could be compared with the archaeological evidence. After experimenting
with different assumptions concerning the productivity of prehistoric maize
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and the fertility and longevity of households, the authors concluded that
climate change alone is insufficient to explain the eventual abandonment of
Long House Valley.
The Long House Valley agents fulfil the standard textbook requirement
(e.g. Ferber 1999, pp.9–10) that agents should be autonomous (directed
by their own goals), goal-directed (behave in an attempt to achieve their
goals), reactive (change their behaviour in response to the properties of
the environment) and—usually—situated (have an explicit location in the
environment). It is, however, possible to add additional complexity de-
signed to make agents more human-like. Thus Ferber (1999) notes that
agents may additionally maintain a representation of their world and thus
be capable of cognition, be social in the sense of interacting with and in
particular maintaining patterned interaction with other agents, and be ca-
pable of reproduction involving some kind of recombination or mutation of
their attributes. All of these ‘extensions’ have in fact been implemented in
archaeological agent-based models, in some cases more than 20 years ago.
Thus, for example, Mithen (1990) and Lake’s (2000) agent-based models
of Mesolithic hunter-gatherer foraging very explicitly model agents learn-
ing about their environment and using the information so gained to inform
their decision-making; in the case of Lake’s model this extends to each agent
having a geographically referenced cognitive map of its environment. Both
these models rely on agents having memory, but in another case the capacity
and longevity of agent memory was itself the subject of enquiry (Costopou-
los 2001). Similarly, a number of archaeological agent-based models have
incorporated aspects of social interaction, ranging from inter-agent social
learning (Kohler et al. 2012b; Lake 2000; Mithen 1989; Premo 2012; Premo
and Scholnick 2011) through simple collective decision-making (Lake 2000)
to exchange (Bentley et al. 2005; Kobti 2012), group formation (Doran et al.
1994; Doran and Palmer 1995) and the emergence of leaders (Kohler et al.
2012b). Agent reproduction involving recombination or mutation of at-
tributes can also be found in archaeological agent-based models, including
Kachel et als’ (2011) evaluation of the so-called ‘grandmother hypothesis’
for human evolution, Lake’s (2001b) model of the evolution of the hominin
capacity for cultural learning and Xue et als’ (2011) model of the extent
to which achieving a high degree of adaption to the environment can be
detrimental in the long term.
As well as making agents more human-like, it is also possible to extend
a paradigmatic agent-based model by explicitly modelling feedback between
agent behaviour and the properties of the environment in which the agents
are situated. In a very simple agent-based model the environment might
be completely unchanging. This was not the case in the Long House Valley
model, since that model explicitly included external environmental forcing
by altering the maize yield over time in accordance with the palaeoclimatic
reconstruction. Other archaeological agent-based models make the envi-
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ronment even more dynamic by, for example, explicitly modelling resource
degradation as a result of agent activity. One of the first models to achieve
this was the first (mid 1990’s) version of Kohler et als’ Village ABM, which
explicitly incorporated reduced yields from continued farming (2000; 2012a).
More recent versions of the Village ABM also explicitly model the population
growth of prey species such as deer (Johnson and Kohler 2012). Unsurpris-
ingly, some of the most sophisticated modelling of environmental change is to
be found in agent-based models conceived as part of the growing programme
of ‘socionatural’ studies (McGlade 1995; van der Leeuw and Redman 2002;
Kohler and van der Leeuw 2007a) of the socioecological (Barton et al. 2010a)
dynamics of long-term human environment interaction. At present there is
a concerted effort to further this agenda by coupling agent-based models
of human behaviour with established geographical information systems or
other raster models of natural processes such as soil erosion (e.g. Barton
et al. 2010b,a; Kolm and Smith 2012).
I have recently provided an up-to-date review of the use of computer
simulation in archaeology (Lake 2013), which includes detailed discussion
of the vicissitudes and subject matter of archaeological agent-based mod-
elling. For the purposes of this chapter it is worth drawing out three main
points. The first is that archaeologists have used simulation models that
exhibit many of the characteristics of agent-based models for almost as
long as they have used computers, and certainly long before adoption of
the term ‘agent-based model’ in the 1990s. Wobst considered that the ap-
proach taken in his 1974 computer simulation model of Palaeolithic social
systems could “best be conceptualized as an educational game consisting of
a gaming table (area), pieces (people), rules (biological or cultural rules of
behavior), and a series of different outcomes depending on the specifications
of the components” (Wobst 1974, p.158); clearly, we would now call this
an agent-based model, as Wobst has himself noted (2010, p.9). Thomas’
(1972) model of Shoshonean subsistence also exhibits some of the charac-
teristics of an agent-based model (particularly in its implementation of a
spatially heterogeneous environment) and Wright and Zeder’s 1977 simu-
lation model of linear exchange is another that could be considered to be
an early agent-based model (Doran 2000, p.90). Mithen’s late 1980s simula-
tion model of Mesolithic hunter-gather decision-making (Mithen 1987, 1990)
is perhaps the most recent well-known agent-based simulation model that
was not explicitly labelled as such. Even recent textbooks on ABM now
acknowledge that “agent-based modelling is no longer a completely new ap-
proach” (Railsback and Grimm 2012, p.11), but they also note the potential
advantage that “the worst mistakes have been made and corrected” (ibid.).
This, of course, will only be true if new modellers drawn in by ever more
user-friendly software make the effort to acquaint themselves with earlier
agent-based models and avoid naively re-inventing the wheel.
The second point that can be drawn from my review of archaeological
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simulation is that, although something like agent-based modelling has been
used in archaeology for 40 years, there has unquestionably been an explosion
of interest in the technique since the turn of the millennium. Kohler and
Gumerman’s (2000) influential collection of agent-based models, Dynamics
in Human and Primate Societies, heralded the arrival in archaeology of fully
modern and self-identified agent-based simulation. The influence of mod-
ern agent-based modelling on the resurgence of archaeological interest in
computer simulation more generally can not be overstated: over 50% of the
c. 70 substantive archaeological simulation models published between 2001
and March 2013 are agent-based models (Lake 2013). These models differ
widely in complexity, ranging from those that barely meet the minimum
textbook definition of an agent-based model, but were implemented using
the computational framework provided by an agent-based simulation toolkit
(e.g. Bentley et al. 2004), through relatively simple abstract models that are
however unquestionably agent-based (e.g. Premo 2007), to much more com-
plex realistic models that exhibit many of the optional attributes discussed
above (e.g. Kohler et al. 2012a; Wilkinson et al. 2007).
A final point to make about the status of agent-based modelling in ar-
chaeology is that it can now be argued to have acquired a degree of method-
ological maturity (Lake 2013). First, a high proportion of recent publications
reporting simulation results do not foreground the method itself, or at the
very least they balance the account of method with a substantive research
conclusion. The latter point provides the second line of evidence that sim-
ulation has finally come of age as part of the archaeological toolkit: that
archaeological simulation models increasingly provide results that are useful
to researchers who were not involved in the modelling process (i.e. they have
what Innis 1972, p.34 referred to as “output utility”). That said, it is also
clear that agent-based modelling is by no means evenly distributed across
all areas of archaeological enquiry, but is largely concentrated in the study
of human evolution, evolutionary archaeology and the aforementioned area
of socionatural studies. Furthermore, these areas are in turn differentiated
by the extent to which they favour relatively simple models offering a high
level of abstraction (typical of human evolution and evolutionary archaeol-
ogy) or more complex models offering greater realism (typical of socionatural
studies), an issue to which I will return.
2 Why agent-based modelling?
As just discussed, there has been a resurgence of interest in the application
of computer simulation to archaeological problems, and agent-based models
account for over half of all archaeological computer simulation undertaken
in the new millennium. Even if this burgeoning activity reflects increased
acceptance of the general case for using computer simulation—of whatever
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kind—in archaeology, it is very likely to have been triggered by the concep-
tual accessibility of agent-based modelling and/or the sense that agent-based
modelling is part of a scientific paradigm that aligns well with contemporary
archaeological interests. Each of these reasons for the growth of agent-based
modelling is discussed in turn.
2.1 The general case for computer simulation in archaeology
The case for using computer simulation in archaeology has been well-rehearsed
(e.g. initially in Doran 1970 and more recently in Kohler 2000 and Premo
et al. 2005) and has four main strands: enforcing conceptual clarity in the
interest of ‘doing science’, helping understand how things change, helping
infer past behaviour from a static archaeological record, and testing other
quantitative methods.
The case for computer simulation starts with the observation that ar-
chaeologists routinely build models, that is “ pieces of machinery that relate
observations to theoretical ideas” (Clarke 1972, p.2). As Kohler and van
der Leeuw (2007a, p.3) remind us, even informal explanations for “how”
or “why” something happened in the past are in fact models. Of course,
some models are more formal than others, although even formal models
vary greatly in their means of expression, ranging from, for example, the
material replica of an Iron Age roundhouse through algorithmic specifica-
tion of hunter-gatherer decision-making to the use of coupled differential
equations to study the rise of urbanism. The advantage of formal modelling
is that, by making explicit and unambiguous the relationships between the
things in the model and also the intended scope of the model, it is easier to
determine whether the model is supposed to be applicable to some observed
phenomenon and, if so, whether it adequately predicts or fits it. This in turn
facilitates the pursuit of archaeology as a science, whether one wishes to test
a hypothesis in accordance with the hypothetico-deductive framework of the
New Archaeology (Watson et al. 1971), or explore the utility of a model in a
manner more consistent with contemporary model-based science (see Kohler
and van der Leeuw 2007a, p.3 for a manifesto; also commentary in section 4).
Thus one of the most important benefits of computer simulation is simply
that in order to implement a model as a computer programme it must be
very precisely specified in mathematical or algorithmic terms (Doran 1970,
p.298). If the modeller learns something from this process then the simula-
tion can be said to have “conceptual utility” (Innis 1972, p.33) because it
has served to “create new problems and view old ones in new and interesting
ways” (Zubrow 1981, p.143). Of course, actually solving problems requires
an appropriate inferential strategy (Premo 2007), as discussed in section 4.1.
While computer simulation models may be among the most formal and
least ambiguous of all kinds of model, the characteristic which sets them
apart from other kinds of models is, of course, that they are iterative (Clarke
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1972, p.2). One should, however, distinguish between iterative models in
general (numerical models) and simulation models in particular (see Lake
2001a, p.723–4 for more detailed discussion). Numerical modelling is often
used to obtain an approximate solution to some analytically intractable
mathematical model which has been designed to predict the equilibrium
state of a system, but without any interest in how it came about (for example
an optimal subsistence strategy, as per e.g. Belovsky 1987). In contrast,
simulation models are explicitly concerned with the passage of time and the
state of the system changes by a process that is in some way analogous to
the process of change in the real world (Doran and Hodson 1975, p.286 and
Renfrew 1981, pp.292–3). This explicit modelling of process is important
for two reasons.
First, computer simulation subtly shifts the focus of modelling from ask-
ing “how it works” to “how it got to be as it [was]” (Allen and McGlade
1987, p.724). In this, simulation better aligns formal modelling with mod-
ern understanding of the importance of non-linearity, recursion and noise
in the evolution of living systems, whether that is couched in the language
of chaos (Schuster 1988), complexity (Waldrop 1992), niche construction
(Odling-Smee et al. 2003), structuration (Giddens 1984), evolutionary drive
(Allen and McGlade 1987) or contingency (Gould 1989). Thus, to pick just
three examples of explicit concern with past dynamics, archaeologists have
built non-linear dynamical systems models to investigate the likelihood of
instability in European Bronze Age exchange systems (McGlade 1997), and
agent-based models to explore cyclical nucleation and dispersion in Jomon
settlement (Crema 2013) and the optimal adaptive fit to environments punc-
tuated by rapid reversals (Xue et al. 2011).
Second, and related, the focus of simulation on process fits well with the
notion that archaeology has as much or more to offer contemporary society
as a science of long-term societal change and human-environment interac-
tion than it does as a provider of ethnographic-scale snapshots of the past.
While the latter can usefully challenge us to recognise the diversity of human
lifeways, it is only by studying processes that one can explain why particular
lifeways obtained in particular circumstances. Furthermore, understanding
the processes that drive social change and environmental adaptation affords
the possibility of predicting how contemporary lifeways might evolve in the
future, especially if one studies such processes in the spirit that “history is
still running” (Allen et al. 2006, p.2). Archaeologists working under the ban-
ner of socionatural studies are particularly conscious of this last point and
have forcefully made the case for “an enhanced role for archaeologists in the
study of contemporary environmental issues” (van der Leeuw and Redman
2002, abstract), even going so far as to suggest that modern archaeology
has the potential to be “at the center of modern studies of long-term global
change” (van der Leeuw 2008, p.477). The intellectual antecedents of this
agenda can be found in Leslie White’s interest in the long-term evolution
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of energy capture and Julian Steward’s awareness that environmental adap-
tation is mediated through material culture and knowledge (Kohler and
van der Leeuw 2007a, p.11), but the contemporary approach is augmented
with more sophisticated understanding of the nature of change in complex
systems, one which rejects the a priori assumption of a unilineal trajectory
and which can now be better pursued through advances in computer simula-
tion (see Barton 2013 for a recent manifesto and Kohler and Varien 2012 for
the history and role of simulation in one long-running socionatural study).
While computer simulation helps archaeologists study how processes of
social and environmental change unfold, and thus contributes to archae-
ology as a human science uniquely equipped to study long-term change in
socionatural systems, it also contributes to the more specifically archaeologi-
cal problem of inferring what specific processes, that is, behaviour, produced
the observed archaeological evidence. Binford (1981) long ago made the ar-
gument that archaeologists must infer past dynamics (behaviours) from a
static archaeological record and, of course, the usual means of doing this is
to compare patterns in the archaeological evidence with those expected from
the candidate behaviour. As Kohler et al. (2012a, p.40) remind us, archae-
ologists usually make the connection between a particular behaviour and
an expected archaeological pattern on the basis of “intuition or common
sense, ethnographic analogies and environmental regularities, or in some
cases experimental archaeology”, but computer simulation offers another—
sometimes the only—way of doing this. For example, Mithen’s (1988; 1990)
computer simulation of Mesolithic hunting goals generated a virtual faunal
assemblage whose species composition could then be compared with the ar-
chaeological record. In similar vein, Premo’s (2005) simulation of Pleistocene
hominin food sharing created virtual assemblages which revealed that the
dense artifact accumulations at Olduvai and Koobi Fora, long attributed
to central place foraging, could alternatively have been formed by routed
foraging in a patchy environment. These two examples demonstrate the
advantage of adding computer simulation to the archaeologist’s inferential
toolkit: not only that it forces us to codify and make explicit our assump-
tions, but that it also allows us to explore the outcome of behaviours which
can no longer be observed and for which there is no reliable recent historical
record. In addition, it allows us to explore the outcome of behaviour ag-
gregated at the often coarse grained spatial and temporal resolution of the
archaeological record.
The last point, that the archaeological record provides only a—often
sparse—sample of the outcome of whatever behaviour generated it, leads to
another well established archaeological use of computer simulation, which is
not to directly infer the past behaviour in question, but to test the efficacy
of other methods of analysis. The role of such ‘tactical’ simulations is to
provide data whose origin is understood in order to test the inferential power
of the analytical technique in question (Orton 1982). Examples to date
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include tests of measures of the quantity of pottery (ibid.), multivariate
statistics (Aldenderfer 1981), cladistic methods (Eerkens et al. 2005) and
the relationship between temporal frequency distributions and prehistoric
demography (Surovell and Brantingham 2007).
2.2 The conceptual accessibility of agent-based modelling
It can be argued that specifically agent-based modelling is more accessible
than other forms of computer simulation for both technical and conceptual
reasons. The technical (i.e. computer science / software) dimension of agent-
based modelling is discussed in chapters 4, 7 and 8, so here I focus on four
ways in which agent-based modelling can be considered conceptually more
accessible than other forms of computer simulation (such as dynamical sys-
tems modelling). Two of these concern the description of rules and outputs,
and the other two concern what can be modelled.
First, it seems appropriate to start this discussion with the output of
agent-based modelling, since that probably influences how agent-based mod-
elling is perceived in the wider community. While it is true that the initial
output from an agent-based model can be quite undigestable, comprising
nothing more than many thousands of lines of a numerical log, it can be—
and often is—visually attractive and, in particular, comprehensible in com-
monsense terms. At one extreme, it is now possible to integrate agent-based
modelling with virtual reality so as to produce a photorealistic rendering
of agents moving through a reconstructed palaeolandscape. This has been
demonstrated for an agent-based simulation of Mesolithic hunter-gatherers
foraging in a landscape that is now submerged under the North Sea (Ch’ng
2007; Ch’ng et al. 2011) and, while it is not clear what data is recorded
for more conventional analysis, there is no doubt that this kind of real-
ism captures the imagination of the public and less quantitatively inclined
archaeologists alike. More common, however is two-dimensional mapping,
for example, of the location of households presented as a series of snap-
shots at fixed intervals (e.g. Kohler et al. 2005, p.79), the path followed
by an individual agent (e.g. Costopoulos 2001, Fig.9), or the distribution of
artefacts discarded by agents (e.g. Lake 2000, Fig.7). In my experience, non-
specialists find the spatial patterns often output by agent-based simulations
more readily comprehensible than the purely temporal patterns output by
other methods such as dynamical systems models (perhaps with the excep-
tion of population curves, such as those found in Kohler et al. 2012a). More-
over, the conclusions of dynamical systems models are often supported by
phase portraits and phase diagrams (e.g. McGlade 1997), both of which as-
sume a facility with mathematical abstraction that is not widespread among
conventionally trained archaeologists. Admittedly, the output from some
agent-based models is not so dissimilar (see Lake and Crema 2012 for an
example) and it can certainly be argued (Premo 2007; also discussion in
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section 4.1) that more agent-based models should be published with phase
diagrams denoting the results of systematic experimentation, but the over-
arching point stands: even if there is no necessary connection between the
visual output of a model and its scientific utility, agent-based simulations
can and frequently do capture the imagination of non-modellers in a way
that other simulation techniques do not.
Second, moving backwards from outputs to inputs, agent-based mod-
elling is also accessible in the sense that it does not enforce one particular
way of specifying the rules which govern the behaviour of entities in the
model: this can be done mathematically, but it can also be done purely
algorithmically (e.g. Rubio-Campillo et al. 2011; Costopoulos 2001) or using
artificial intelligence formalisms such as production rules (e.g. Doran et al.
1994; Reynolds 1987). The fact that agent-based modelling does not require
the mathematical formality of dynamical systems modelling may well partly
account for its greater uptake, since algorithmic rules are typically closer in
form to the verbal specifications of informal models.
Third, agent-based modelling is accessible in the sense that it offers great
flexibility with respect to what can be modelled. It has already been noted
that while most agent-based models share certain paradigmatic features, not
all these are necessary and others can be added. Thus, for example, agent-
based models can employ models of space ranging from purely topological
networks to geographically referenced representations of the earth’s surface.
Similarly, agents may be purely reactive (they behave) or they may be cog-
nitive (they reason using their own models of what is in their environment),
and they may or may not communicate with other agents (Ferber 1999).
Section 1 of this chapter listed some examples which demonstrate how this
flexibility allows archaeologists with quite different interests to make use of
agent-based modelling.
Finally, although agent-based modelling is—as a technique—scale ag-
nostic, in most archaeological examples the agents are ethnographic-scale,
in other words, they represent individual human beings or small groups, such
as households. In practice, then, agent-based simulation is accessible in the
sense that it tends to realign computer simulation with both the common-
sense lay notion that archaeology is about what people did in the past, as
well as the more explicitly theorised objections to systemic thinking raised by
proponents of post-processual archaeology (e.g. Shanks and Tilley 1987b).
The interweaving of archaeological computer simulation and archaeological
theory is teased out in reviews by Aldenderfer (1998), McGlade (2005) and
Lake (2013), but particular points of contact between post-1980 archaeo-
logical theory and agent-based modelling include agreement that “historical
processes involve the actions of self-aware individuals” (Kohler 2000, p.3)
and the possibility of explicitly modelling cognition (Biskowski 1992; Do-
ran 2000; Mithen 1989). That said, the detail of how agent-based models
represent individuals and their relations with one another raises questions
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about the kind of rationality employed by agents (Lake 2004) and the locus
of causality in human societies (Beekman 2005), and it is clear that some
post-processual archaeologists (e.g. Thomas 1991, 2004) have not been won
over on either count. Their concern, “Is is the world really agent-based?”
(O’Sullivan and Haklay 2000), is discussed in more detail in section 3.
2.3 Agent-based modelling as a scientific paradigm
As just suggested, there are clear points of contact between agent-based
modeling and important strands in post-1980 archaeological theory. This is
very conspicuous in some studies, notably for example Mithen’s Thoughtful
Foragers, which provides a book-length manifesto for a cognitive-processual
archaeology (Renfrew 1994), in this case grounded in behavioural ecol-
ogy and realised with the aid of simulation. Mithen’s focus on individual
decision-making went some way to addressing post processual theorists’ (see
Dornan 2002, pp.308-314 for a review of the various positions taken) concern
that the systemic perspective offered by processual archaeology overlooked
the importance of individual agency and cognition (but see section 3.1), but
at the same time, however, he retained a firm commitment to scientific in-
ference by hypothesis-testing. Nevertheless, although the commitment to
scientific inference and a broadly evolutionary approach is characteristic of
the vast majority of agent-based models (Lake 2013), relatively few share
both the ethnographic-scale and realism (in the sense of attempted close-
ness to actual human decision-making and choice of parameter values) of
Mithen’s model. Instead, most archaeological agent-based models are either
more abstract, or are based on higher-level agents (such as households); they
are also frequently concerned with longer-term change and the emergence
of new phenomena. All this suggests that the uptake of agent-based mod-
elling is better explained by archaeologists’ interest in the wider scientific
paradigm which spawned it rather than its fit with post 1980 archaeological
theory per se.
As with the geographical information systems (GIS) ‘tool or science’ de-
bate (Wright et al. 1997), it is important to recognise that, as a technique,
agent-based modelling can be used for different purposes and in a variety
of theoretical frameworks. Nevertheless, agent-based modelling is closely
associated with complexity science (Waldrop 1992)1, whereas, for exam-
ple, dynamical systems modelling is usually associated with chaos (Schuster
1988) and catastrophe theory (Zeeman 1977). Complexity science gained
real momentum in the late 1980s / early 1990s and, although it builds on
insights won by the formalisation of chaos and catastrophe in the 1960s and
1970s, it also marks a change of emphasis (Beekman and Baden 2005). The
1Although agent-based modelling also has semi-independent roots in ecological mod-
elling, where, as individual-based modelling the initial focus was on the importance of
organism heterogeneity and spatial localism (DeAngelis and Gross 1992, p.xv).
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mathematics of chaos provided tools to deal with the unpredictability and
non-linearity of many real world processes, including some of obvious ar-
chaeological interest such as population growth (May 1976). Catastrophe
theory ultimately proved more difficult to apply in the real world, but at
minimum it reinforced the message that profound transformation does not
necessarily require many factors working in tandem and nor does it necessar-
ily require a strong external push (Renfrew and Poston 1979). Complexity
science blends these insights with others from a different intellectual lineage
that includes von Neumann’s work on self-reproducing automata, cybernet-
ics and connectionist cognitive science (Epstein and Axtell 1996, p.2) to
focus on the emergence of macro-level properties from the mutual interac-
tion of many micro-level parts, as well as the related question of how such
systems learn (adapt). Unlike dynamical systems models, which normally
work with variables representing aggregate phenomena (e.g. the number of
individuals who have access to prestige goods—see McGlade 1997), agent-
based models explicitly model the micro-level parts (as agents) and so are
particularly well-suited to the complexity science agenda. Cellular automata
share this particular property (the cells representing micro-level parts) and
have also played a significant part in the development of complexity science
(Toffoli and Margolus 1987; Wolfram 1984), but have found less use in ar-
chaeology as they are more restrictive in terms of the kinds of real-world
phenomena they can represent (but see Mithen and Reed 2002 and Nikitas
and Nikita 2005 for two archaeological applications of cellular automata).
The clearest manifestation of the impact of complexity science and agent-
based modelling in the social sciences is the attempt to do what Epstein
and Axtell (1996, p.177) have labelled generative social science. Their book
Growing Artifical Societies demonstrates how agent-based modelling can be
used to grow social phenomena in silico “from the bottom up”. In the
most basic version of their now famous model Sugarscape, the actions of
agents pursuing individual goals (to harvest and consume ‘sugar’ deposited
on a landscape) produce population-level phenomena such as a characterisic
power-law wealth distribution and waves of advance across space. Following
further experiments with versions of Sugarscape that include more ‘human’
elements, including sexual reproduction, cultural transmission, combat, ex-
change and disease, Esptein and Axtell conclude that “A wide range of
important social, or collective, phenomena can be made to emerge from the
spatio-temporal interaction of autonomous agents operating on landscapes
under simple local rules” (ibid., p.153, my emphasis). Not only does this
observation align social science with the interests of complexity science, but
it also led Esptein and Axtell to propose a new model of explanation for
the social sciences, one which they claim is neither deductive nor inductive,
but ‘generative’: they interpret the question “can you explain it?” as asking
“can you grow it?” (ibid., p.177) and thus they propose that explanation
consists in “demonstrating that certain sets of microspecifications are suf-
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ficient to generate the macrophenomenon of interest” (ibid., p.20, original
emphasis). On top of this epistemic move, Epstein and Axtell also argue that
agent-based modelling provides the appropriate tool to overcome several spe-
cific deficiencies of contemporary social science: the use of local rather than
global rules provides a “natural methodology for relaxing. . . assumptions”
about the perfect rationality of actors (ibid., p.1); the possibility of agents
having different characteristics overcomes the explicit or implicit suppression
of agent heterogeneity; and the focus on dynamics overcomes preoccupation
with static equilibria at the expense of exploring transitional states which
might actually be more important or interesting (ibid., p.16). Overall, then,
Epstein and Axtell hope that the agent-based approach will “yield a new,
more unified and evolutionary social science, one in which migrations, de-
mographic patterns, tribes, and tribal conflict, epidemics, markets, firms,
institutions, and governments all emerge from the bottom up” (ibid., p162,
original emphasis).
The Sugarscape agent-based model has been hugely influential: it is
widely used for teaching computational social science and, within archae-
ology, is explicitly acknowledged as the inspiration for early examples of
(modern) agent-based modelling such as the Long House Valley model (Ax-
tell et al. 2002). Perhaps even more importantly, however, the very idea
of generative social science has been gaining traction in archaeology. This
is most obvious in writing that explicitly invokes Growing Artificial Soci-
eties, for example Kohler’s (2000) manifesto for the potential of agent-based
modelling to help with the task of “putting social sciences together again”
and Premo’s (2008, p.36) call to use agent-based models as “behavioural
laboratories”, but it also underwrites other statements of the principal that
agent-based models should be generative (e.g. Costopoulos 2009, p.273). In
fact, it can be argued that the majority of recent archaeological agent-based
simulations adopt at least some aspects of the generative social science pro-
gramme even if they do not explicitly invoke it. For example, many of the
agent-based models designed to tackle problems in human evolution and/or
evolutionary archaeology are concerned with emergence, the value of null
models, or the less than perfect rationality of agents.
Premo’s (2010) investigation of how a ‘scatter and patches’ archaeologi-
cal landscape could have been produced by relatively simple Plio-Pleistocene
hominin foraging and food-sharing behaviours is partly a study of an emer-
gent phenomena. One could also argue that the models designed to demon-
strate the effect of population size and structure on cultural trait diversity
and cumulative innovation (e.g. Lake and Crema 2012; Powell et al. 2009;
Premo 2012) also seek to explain how a population-level phenomenon, in
this case cultural complexity, emerges from the interaction of agents.
Closely related to the notion of emergence is the realisation that com-
plex patterns can be produced by the iteration of simple rules, which has
in turn lead to recognition of the value of null models as a starting point of
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enquiry. Premo’s aforementioned model of Plio-Pleistocene food-sharing is
explicitly offered as null model (Premo 2007, p.34). More recently, Bentley
and Ormerod have argued for the utility of models which assume “zero-
intelligence” (2012, pp.205–6) on the part of agents. Bentley and Ormerod
do not think that real-world agents really have zero-intelligence, but given
that complexity science suggests that “many of the emergent, often complex,
patterns in society need not require complex behavior on the part of individ-
uals” (ibid., p.205) they want to know how far we can get with simple social
physics null models and what must be added to them to explain social phe-
nomena. Bentley and colleagues have already demonstrated that a simple
model of random copying is sufficient to explain the frequency distributions
of cultural variants in first names, archaeological pottery, applications for
technology patents, chosen dog breeds and popular music (Bentley et al.
2004, 2007).
As well as demonstrating the potential power of null models, the success
of random copying models also reinforces our understanding that humans
are not, in the main, perfectly rational decision-makers. In the context
of null modelling this claim is usually predicated on the observation that
humans do not have sufficient computational capacity to make optimal de-
cisions and/or they do not have access to all the relevant information (e.g.
Bentley and Ormerod 2012, pp.205–6). Exactly what is meant by ratio-
nality is further discussed in section 3.1, but the notion that humans are
imperfect decision-makers because they only have access to spatially and/or
temporally ‘local’ information has long been incorporated into archaeologi-
cal agent-based models of hunter-gather foraging (see for example Reynolds
1987 and Mithen 1990); it is also now the explicit focus of enquiry in studies
that seek to investigate the importance of noise (imperfect environmental
tracking) in long-term adaptation (Xue et al. 2011).
Models such as those just cited demonstrate that the post-2000 uptake of
agent-based modelling in archaeology has been accompanied by an interest
in at least some strands of complexity science in general and generative so-
cial science in particular, even if it has not always been explicitly framed in
those terms. While there are models which do not fit this characterisation so
neatly, particularly tactical models (e.g. Rubio-Campillo et al. 2011), in the
main there is a sense in which agent-based modelling has been adopted by
archaeologists as both a technique and a scientific paradigm. It can be ar-
gued, however, that the particular strands of complexity science commonly
found in archaeological agent-based models, such as relatively ‘simple’ emer-
gent phenomena, the use of null models and a focus on limited rationality,
reflect a particular perspective on complexity science, the Complex Adaptive
Systems approach, that was strongly promoted by the Sante Fe Institute in
the late 1980s and early 1990s. As Beekman and Baden (2005, p.7) rightly
caution, the application of ideas from complexity science to social phenom-
ena has a different emphasis in Europe, where there is greater interest in
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explicitly cognitive issues, including emotion and irrationality (Doran 2000)
and, perhaps most importantly, a greater willingness to treat social sys-
tems as qualitatively different from other complex systems (Gilbert 1995).
Although they note that “archaeologists working within this intellectual mi-
lieu have often chosen to use nonlinear concepts as metaphors to frame a
verbal analysis rather than develop computer simulations” (ibid.) it is worth
considering whether this is because textbook agent-based modelling, which
is largely grounded in the Complex Adaptive Systems approach, carries with
it particular—and perhaps debatable—assumptions about the way the world
is?
3 Ontological considerations: Emergence and ra-
tionality
As briefly alluded to above, the rapid deployment of GIS in a number of
disciplines eventually led to debate about whether the technique is simply
a tool that can be used for many purposes in a variety of theoretical frame-
works, or whether it carries certain theoretical ‘baggage’ such that its use
requires explicit or implicit adherence to particular theoretical principles or
assumptions (in geography see Pickles 1999; Wright et al. 1997; in archae-
ology see Wheatley 1993; Gaffney and van Leusen 1995). Similar questions
have been asked of agent-based modelling, although the anxiety seems less
widespread and largely confined to two key issues: is the rationality of agents
a good model of human rationality and in what sense do social phenomena
emerge.
3.1 The rationality of agents
As has been documented elsewhere (Lake 2004) and remains true today,
the agents in archaeological agent-based simulations have generally been
ascribed a rationality that is grounded in either human biology (typically
optimal foraging theory or evolutionary psychology), or modern economics.
Some archaeologists have argued that the biological and/or economic ground-
ing of agent rationality is undesirable as it projects modern rationality back
into the past and precludes the possibility of discovering that the past re-
ally was different. Thus, directly addressing agent-based modelling, Thomas
(1991, p.1) claimed that “The rationality which Mithen seeks to identify on
the part of his Mesolithic foragers is a very specific one: it is the instrumen-
tal reason of late capitalism”. In similar vein, but targeted at evolutionary
archaeology more generally, Shanks and Tilley (1987a, p.56) expressed dis-
quiet about recourse to either evolutionary biology or economics, since in
their view the former leaves a “plastic, malleable cultural dope incapable of
altering the conditions of his or her existence” (Shanks and Tilley 1987a,
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p.56) and the latter “naturalizes what are historically and culturally specific
values as universal features of humanity” (Shanks and Tilley 1987b, p.188).
The cultural specificity of rationality has also been emphasised by Cowgill,
who claimed that “The allegedly universal rationality assumed by ‘economic
man’ models is shown by anthropological knowledge to be the very oppo-
site” (2000, p.55), and Clark who, comparing an approach to agency rooted
in evolutionary theory with one rooted in practice theory, complained that
“the individuals in optimal foraging models know more than real agents
could know. Rational decisions require perfect knowledge of particulars and
decision-making rules, which are cultural” (2000, p.108).
The central question here is not whether attributing to agents rationali-
ties grounded in evolutionary biology or economics is appropriate (see Kohler
2000 and Mithen 1990 for arguments in favour of evolutionary biology as
a source of agent rationality), but rather, whether agent-based simulation
is limited to these kinds of rationality? In order to address this question,
however, it is necessary to be clear what one means by rationality. The
textbook view from artificial intelligence is that “A rational agent is one
that does the right thing” (Russell and Norvig 2003, p.34), in other words,
one “whose actions make sense from the point of view of the information
possessed by the agent and its goals (or the task for which it was defined)”
(Russell 1999, p.13). The important and perhaps surprising consequence of
this (informal) definition is that “What counts in the first instance is what
the agent does, not necessarily what it thinks, or even whether it thinks
at all” (ibid, p.13). Thus the emphasis is first and foremost on what Simon
(1956) termed substantive rationality—what decision to make—, rather than
procedural rationality—how to make the decision. For the purposes of com-
putation, substantive rationality is formalised through the agent function,
which can be conceived as a table that records what action an agent per-
forms as a result of a given percept sequence (a history of everything the
agent has ever perceived). Procedural rationality is formalised through the
agent program, which is the internal mechanism used by the agent to imple-
ment the agent function and which, in the case of a cognitive agent, will be
some kind of reasoning process.
Archaeologists who criticise the rationality accorded to agents in agent-
based models and/or evolutionary and computational approaches more gen-
erally are not always explicit about what they mean by rationality, or at
least not in terms that allow direct comparison with the way rationality is
understood in artificial intelligence. The necessary translation requires a
detailed textual analysis, which falls outside the scope of this paper but I
have attempted it elsewhere (Lake 2004, pp.195–197). I concluded that some
critics (e.g. Clark 2000) are primarily concerned that the rationalities of past
agents might need to be described by different agent functions, or as Clark
put it, past agents “just have different motives” (ibid., p.101). Where that is
the concern, there are no grounds for rejecting agent-based modelling since
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the technique does not require agent functions derived from either modern
economic theory or evolutionary biology. Of course, it must be possible to
state the agent function in a computer programming language, so in practice
it may be easier to do this for economic and biologically grounded rational-
ities for the simple reason that we have explicitly theorised them, but in
principle, there is no reason why agent-based simulations should necessarily
project modern substantive rationality back into the past. On the other
hand, other critics of computational and evolutionary archaeology (Cowgill
2000; Thomas 1991) extend their concern to the agent program, that is, how
agents make decisions: for example, Thomas states that “Desires, emotions,
forms of reason and techniques of self-interpretation are all contingent and
historically situated” (Thomas 1991, p.17, my emphasis). Whereas one can
in principle implement a wide range of agent functions in an agent-based
model, it is less certain that agent programs are similarly unconstrained.
Given that philosophers and artificial intelligence researchers are unable to
agree about the limitations of machine intelligence (see Russell and Norvig
2003, chapter 26 for a guide to the main arguments), it is simply not possible
to guarantee that all forms of reasoning that humans have ever employed
can be implemented on the computing devices currently available to us,
never mind in an agent-based model implemented using the standard soft-
ware tools. However, it is also notable that archaeologists who warn against
projecting modern forms of reasoning back into the past do not themselves
provide detailed descriptions of alternative forms which they believe were
employed in specific contexts, quite possibly because they do not have a lan-
guage adequate to that task. Consequently, while it may be that agent-based
simulation imposes some (unknown) limits on models of past procedural ra-
tionality, an attempt to devise non-modern agent programs would at least
provoke much-needed discussion about how to describe alternative forms of
reasoning.
So far I have considered the kind of rationality exhibited by agents, but
Thomas’ critique of Mithen’s agent-based model of Mesolithic hunting as
having created a “cybernetic wasteland” (1988, p.64) extends to the ar-
gument that the agents in Mithen’s model are unhuman because they are
only rational and lack emotion. Mithen responded by acknowledging that
emotional life is indeed “quintessentially human” (1991, p.10), but largely
because it is wrong to counterpose emotion and reasoning, since emotions
actually make rational thought possible by overcoming the problem of what
to do in the face of conflicting goals and/or the impossibility of predicting
the consequences of all available actions. Effectively, by drawing in this way
on the cognitive and functional theories of emotion proposed by Oatley and
Johnson-Laird (1987) and Frijda (Frijda 1987; Frijda and Swagerman 1987),
Mithen simply proposes that emotions are implicitly included in models of
adaptation via rational decision-making (Mithen 1991, p.9). Thus, while he
argues that changes of state between, for example, stalking prey and killing
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it “are only made possible by emotions acting as a system of internal com-
munication: monitoring the success and failure of sub-goals and the need
to adjust behavioural plans” (ibid., p.13), it is not the case that any of the
computer code in his agent-based model could have been omitted had he
denied any role for emotion.
In partial contrast to Mithen’s approach to the problem of incorporating
emotion into agent-based modelling, there is a strand of artifical intelligence
research which seeks to very explicitly model the role of emotion in cognition
(Doran 2000). This research is still grounded in the ‘functional view’ (Frijda
1995) that emotions serve to aid decision-making (Can˜amero and de Velde
2000, p.144), but in its most developed form it involves programming agents
with a ‘synthetic physiology’, which includes variables necessary for survival
(e.g. heart-rate, energy, blood sugar level) and hormones released under
different emotional states which modify the amount of the controlled vari-
ables, thereby amplifying motives and thus ultimately influencing behaviour
(Can˜amero 1997). Thus, whereas the outcome of the emotional influence on
rationality is completely predetermined in Mithen’s model, this is not true in
Can˜amero’s model, at least to the extent that the complexity of the interplay
between emotions and reason may be sufficient to render it unpredictable
in practice. If models like this really do offer the prospect of observing
emotionally influenced behaviour that had not been explicitly imposed by
the modeller then they open up the possibility of incorporating the role of
emotion into the programme of generative social science. Indeed, Can˜amero
and Van de Velde (2000, p.148) describe at length a conceptual design for
an agent-based model which would allow each agent some control over the
expression of emotions according to its state, interests and the image it has
of the other, so allowing emotional states to contribute to the construction
of intersubjectivity (ibid., p.147). Although the bulk of research on agent
emotion is situated within robotics (e.g. papers in Can˜amero and Aylett
2008), the fact that at least some artificial intelligence researchers are pre-
pared to entertain a social constructivist view of emotions (Averill 1990)
makes it difficult to imagine what in-principle objection remains to the use
of agent-based simulation to model human decision-making.
3.2 The emergence of social phenomena
As already noted, emergence is a central concept in complexity science and it
is certainly the case that archaeologists have explicitly suggested that one of
the benefits of using agent-based modelling is that it offers a means to study
emergent phenomena. For example, Kohler and van der Leeuw suggest that
agent-based models “enable us to examine the possibility of the emergence of
new structures (for example, institutions, alliances, and communities) out of
the basal units and their interactions” (2007a, p.6) and go on to emphasise
the possibility of modelling the recursive relationship between the emergent
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structures and the underlying micro-level entities such that “the interaction
between individuals create the society (and its culture), which in turn, affect
the behaviour of the individuals or groups that constitute it” (ibid., p.7).
Kohler also made a more specifically archaeological case for agent-based
modeling: that the things we can measure in the archaeological record are on
the one hand the outcome of agent behaviour “averaged over a great deal of
space and time” but, given that, are also part of the “[context] within which
agents make decisions and perform actions” (Kohler 2000, p.10). This again
points to the idea that agent-based modelling can be used to disentangle an
element of recursion, in this case between agents and their environment. It
was suggested above that a significant number of archaeological agent-based
models have been used to investigate emergence in some sense, but the key
question here is in what sense exactly? This is a difficult question to answer
because there is no widely accepted formal theory of emergence (Epstein
and Axtell 1996, p.35) and indeed some would argue that the notion of
emergence at best “remains vague and ill-defined” (Conte and Gilbert 1995,
p.9) and at worst “seems opaque, and perhaps even incoherent” (Bedau and
Humphreys 2008, p.1).
In philosophical debate the concept of emergence becomes entwined with
fundamental problems such as the mind–body problem (Searle 1992), but in
complexity science, and especially agent-based modelling, the term ‘emer-
gence’ is most often used “to denote stable macroscopic patterns arising
from the local interaction of agents” (Epstein and Axtell 1996, p.35). In the
scheme proposed by the philosopher Bedau, cases of this kind of emergence
are examples of either nominal emergence or weak emergence. Nominal
emergence is the “simplest and barest” notion of emergence (Bedau 2008,
p.158), one in which the emergent phenomena have the kinds of properties
that cannot be micro properties. Thus, for example, Epstein and Axtell ar-
gue that the skewed wealth distribution produced by the Sugarscape model
is an emergent phenomenon because “we do not know what it would mean
for an agent to have a wealth distribution” (1996, p.35). In similar vein,
it is possible to measure the pressure of a gas, but not the pressure of an
individual molecule of that gas. The difference between nominal and weak
emergence is that in the former the emergent properties can be predicted and
explained from the properties of the individual micro-level entities, whereas
in the case of weak emergence “the micro-level interactions are interwoven
in such a complicated network that the global behaviour has no simple ex-
planation” (Bedau 2008, p.160). In general, most of the agent based models
developed under the banner of generative social science exhibit weak emer-
gence. This is true of the archaeological models of Lake and Crema (2012),
Powell et al. (2009) and Premo (2010; 2012) that were discussed earlier,
and Beekman (2005, p.64) provides another list which supports this obser-
vation. Most of these models effectively demonstrate—whether explicitly or
implicitly—that “many of the emergent, often complex, patterns in society
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need not require complex behavior on the part of individuals” (Bentley and
Ormerod 2012, p.205), but on the other hand the interaction between in-
dividuals is often sufficiently complex (typically context dependent in some
way) that it is not possible to predict the emergent phenomena except by
running the simulation. This, of course, is what led Epstein and Axtell
(1996, p.177) to argue that adequate explanation of many social phenomena
consists in demonstrating the “generative sufficiency” of a model (but see
section 4.1) for doubt about the adequacy of this proposition).
Despite the weight of actual modelling practice, there is considerable de-
bate even within the modelling community about whether important social
phenomena such as social institutions are the result of something more than
weak emergence (Beekman 2005; Conte and Gilbert 1995; Gilbert 1995;
Lake 2010; O’Sullivan and Haklay 2000). The two main issues are, first,
whether at least some emergent social phenomena exert ‘reverse’ causal in-
fluence on agents (what Bedau labels strong emergence) and, second—but
less discussed—whether it matters that human agents “are capable of rea-
soning, and do so routinely, about the emergent properties of their own
societies” (Gilbert 1995, p.144).
The reality of reverse causal influence is a long-standing point of con-
tention in sociology (see Gilbert 1995 for more detail). On the one hand,
methdological holists follow in the footsteps of Durkheim and Parsons in
according causal influence to supra-individual social entities. This could
hardly be clearer than in Durkheim’s definition of social facts as “ways of
acting, thinking and feeling that are external to the individual and are en-
dowed with a coercive power by virtue of which they exercise control over
him” (Durkheim 2004, p.59). In similar vein, but much more recently, Ken-
neth Arrow argued that “social categories are used in economic analysis all
the time and that they appear to be absolute necessities of the analysis,
not just figures of speech that can be eliminated if need be” (1994, p.1). In
contrast, methodological individualists (e.g. Watkins 1952; O’Meara 1997,
Mithen 1990 in archaeology) take the view that “large-scale social phenom-
ena must be accounted for by the situations, dispositions and beliefs of in-
dividuals” (Watkins 1952, p.58) and do not accept the ontological reality of
social institutions, since even social roles “can be fully understood in terms
of individuals as long as we take a wide enough perspective so as to include
all those individuals, in other times and places, who create a role” (King
1999, p.216). The last three decades of the Twentieth Century saw numer-
ous attempts to negotiate or even dissolve the micro-macro dichotomy in
sociology (Beekman 2005, p.53). The most frequently cited in archaeology
are Gidden’s (1984) Structuration Theory and Bourdieu’s (1977) Practice
Theory, but in an article specifically examining the relationship between so-
cial theory and agent-based simulations, Beekman notes that the tendency
among archaeologists to chose one or the other—along with the particular
readings that have found their way into archaeology—has in practice ended
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up replicating the dichotomy between discursive strategizing action and non-
discursive practice that characterises the debate between methodological in-
dividualists and methodological holists (Beekman 2005, p.55). Noting that
even individual human beings are emergent entities, Beekman’s own prefer-
ence is an approach grounded in—but not slavishly adhering too—Archer’s
(2000) critique of Structuration Theory (Beekman 2005, pp.62–3), which
recognises multiple scales of collective “at which different rules of action
predominate”. He considers that collective agents are “real social entitites”
(ibid., p.68) and although he does not explicitly say so, strongly implies that
these entities exert reverse causal force on lower-level agents.
This is not the place to attempt to adjudicate between methodologi-
cal holism, methodological individualism and attempts to overcome that
dichotomy, but it is worth reiterating the point that actual practice in
agent-based modelling tends towards methodological individualism (Beek-
man 2005; O’Sullivan and Haklay 2000). Even the few archaeological agent-
based models that have explicitly modelled both individuals and groups
(see Doran et al. 1994; Kohler et al. 2012b; Lake 2000) do not really exhibit
the emergence of reverse causal force since in all cases the establishment of
groups is scaffolded at the outset of the simulation. Consequently, it can
be argued that, to date, the practice of archaeological agent-based simula-
tion does not match Kohler and van der Leeuw’s ambition to investigate
the recursive relationship between individuals and society. Given the lack
of unanimity among sociologists about the status of social institutions it
is far from clear whether this really matters, especially given philosophical
doubts about the ontological status of reverse causal force (e.g. see Bedau
2008, p.159, who argues that “strong emergence starts where scientific ex-
planation ends”). That said, Gilbert makes the important point that if
the definition of weak emergence hinges on the impossibility of analytically
predicting the macro-level phenomena then “any particular emergent prop-
erty stands the risk of being demoted from the status of emergence at some
time in the future” (1995, p.150), which leads him to suggest that the re-
lationship between micro and macro properties of complex systems may be
more interesting than emergence per se. Following in this spirit there may
at the very least be scope to use agent-based modelling to develop a bet-
ter understanding of whether or how reverse causal force amounts to more
than “feedback effects in the agent population, altering the behaviour of
individuals” (Epstein and Axtell 1996, pp.16-7).
The second—albeit less discussed—issue in the debate about whether im-
portant social phenomena such as social institutions are the result of some-
thing more than weak emergence is the question of whether it matters that
human agents reason about the emergent properties of their own societies.
Some taxonomies of emergence do indeed distinguish between emergence
that involves a degree of reflexivity and emergence that does not. For ex-
ample, cognitive psychologist and artificial intelligence researcher Cristiano
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Castelfranchi has proposed four senses of emergence, of which the third is
representational, meaning that the phenomenon in question is “learned or
recognized at the cognitive level” (Conte and Gilbert 1995, p.9). In not dis-
imilar vein, Sunny Auyang posits a three level hierarchy of complex systems
in which the third is cybernetic systems that involve intentionality (Auyang
1998). Sociologist Nigel Gilbert clearly believes that failure to take account
of the capacity of humans to “perceive, monitor and reason with the macro-
properties of the society in which they live” (1995, p.155) undermines the
utility of simulation for addressing the kinds of questions of interest to his
discipline.
One potential difficulty with the argument that the reflexivity of humans
gives rise to a special kind of emergence is that, although the human capacity
to be reflexive is not contested, there is debate—including within archae-
ology (see Hodder 2001, p.10)—about the extent to which social practices
are undertaken by agents who have practical knowledge, that is, who know
“how to go on” in the world “as it is” without consciously reflecting upon
it (Barrett 2001, p.151). This raises the spectre of a quantitative gradation
(how much reflection is taking place) underpinning a qualitative distinction
(a special kind of emergence). I suggest that Crutchfield’s (2008) concept
of intrinsic emergence may provide a solution to this conundrum. Crutch-
field notes that in well-known physical examples of self-organizing phenom-
ena (e.g. Rayleigh-Be´nard convection cells in heated liquids) “the patterns
which appear are detected by the observers and analysts” but, crucially,
there is no reason to believe that those experiments behaved differently be-
fore the self-organizing phenomena were detected by scientists (ibid, p.271).
Consequently, he argues that “it is the observer or analyst who lends the
teleological ‘self’ to processes which otherwise simply ‘organize’ according to
the underlying dynamical constraints” (ibid.). Crutchfield proposes that, in
contrast, intrinsic emergence occurs when “the patterns formed confer ad-
ditional functionality which supports global information processing” (ibid.,
p.272), or in other words, the system itself has ‘discovered’ the pattern.
Significantly for our purposes, however, Crutchfield makes it clear that ‘dis-
covery’ does not require a cognitive representation, but can be “[implicit]
in the dynamics and behaviour of a process” if the system makes use of the
new pattern (ibid.). Thus, the concept of intrinsic emergence may provide a
means of recognising the reflexivity of social systems (albeit not necessarily
just human systems) as something more profound than weak emergence, but
without running into the problem of measuring the extent to which social
practice is practical or discursive.
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4 Epistemic considerations: how to learn by agent-
based modelling
Earlier it was suggested that archaeologists use computer simulation for one
or more of four purposes: enforcing conceptual clarity, helping understand
how things change, helping infer past behaviour from a static archaeologi-
cal record, and testing other quantitative methods. The second and third of
these are of particular interest here, since models built for understanding how
things change and those built for infering past behaviour typically consti-
tute the most fully worked through attempts to explain aspects of the human
past. Within the archaeological simulation literature there is an established
distinction between ‘theory-building’ and ‘hypothesis-testing’ models (e.g.
Mithen 1994, pp.176–177), according to which the aim of hypothesis-testing
models is to determine what actually happened in the past by comparing
the output of a simulated process against the archaeological evidence, while
the use of simulation models to support theory-building does not necessar-
ily involve detailed comparison of output against the archaeological record
since the purpose is not to test what happened in the past, but rather
to understand how certain processes work and what sort of changes could
plausibly have occurred. It can increasingly be questioned whether this is a
particularly useful distinction, since, on the one hand, comparing simulation
output with the archaeological evidence can contribute to theory-building
(e.g. Kohler and Varien 2012), while on the other hand, simulation can be
used to directly test hypotheses which are more about possible processes
(e.g. the effect of parameters on model dynamics) than what actually hap-
pened in the past (see Premo 2010, pp.29–30). Rather than attempting to
force models into a rigid taxonomy according to which each class represents
a discrete inferential role, it seems more productive to focus attention on
issues of modelling logic that commonly arise when attempting to learn by
simulation.
4.1 Learning by simulation requires experimentation not just
emulation
Earlier it was noted that the visual accessibility of many agent-based mod-
els may well be a significant factor in the rapidly growing popularity of the
technique. Paradoxically, however, this same accessibility to non-specialists
may also contribute to a lack of understanding that effective use of simula-
tion requires an experimental approach. In a series of articles, Premo (2005;
2007; 2008) has been particularly forceful in arguing that merely emulating
the past does not explain it. The basic problem is relatively simple: by
iteratively adjusting the process and/or parameters of a model it will prob-
ably be possible to obtain a reasonable fit between the model output and
the archaeological evidence (an emulation), but this does not guarantee that
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only this process/parameters could have caused what happened in the past
(the problem of equifinality) and nor does it provide a good understanding
of the probability of this particular outcome versus others. Such underde-
termination might not be a problem for those persuaded by constructive
empiricism as an account of science, that is, the proposition that the aim
of science is to produce theories that are empirically adequate rather than
literally true (Fraassen 1980; see Kelley and Hanen 1988 for archaeological
supporters), but it is a problem if one believes, as do most contemporary
philosophers of science (Preston 2014), that scientific theories are literally
either true or false, whether one can actually know that (as per scientific
realism) or not (as per conjectural realism). It also casts some doubt on
Epstein and Axtell’s proposition that the programme of generative social
science should equate explanation with answering the question “can you
grow it?” (1996, p.177), since successfully ‘growing’ some phenomenon does
not automatically overcome the problem of underdetermination—that there
might be some other way of growing the same phenomenon.
Given that the significance of underdetermination is a major point of
contention in the philosophy of science, it is hardly surprising that there is
no simple solution for overcoming the problem of equifinality in archaeolog-
ical inference. That said, computer simulation at least has the advantage
that, if used as a “behavioural laboratory” (Premo 2008), it allows us to
explicitly explore what alternative models might equally or better fit the
observed phenomenon, and/or do so with less sensitivity to aspects of the
model for which there is limited independent evidence. This requires two
important moves. The first is that modelling starts with an explicit theory,
in order that the prior understanding is rendered brittle enough by the need
to maintain internal consistency that it can be broken, that is, found to
be inadequate. The second move is to adopt an experimental exploratory
design (ibid., p.49), one which does not simply attempt to replicate some
observed phenomenon, but systematically explores the consequences of the
model under a wide range of circumstances, only some of which may actu-
ally have obtained in the past. By re-running Gould’s ‘tape of history’ (see
Premo 2008, pp.49–50 for detailed discussion) in this way, the modeller can
generate an ensemble of “‘what if’ scenarios” (ibid., p.50) or “alternative
cultural histories” (Gumerman and Kohler 2001) which can then provoke
rejection of the model or form the basis of an explanation of the observed
phenomenon in the sense of delineating what conditions must have been met
for that phenomenon to have occurred if the model is correct.
Although appropriate experimental design is vital to productive use of
simulation, two intrinsic properties of simulation models are also important:
whether a model is generative and whether it is simple or complex. Each is
considered in turn.
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4.2 The most informative models are generative
As discussed in section 2.3, the program of generative social science is built
around a particular view of what constitutes an explanation. For Epstein
and Axtell the aim of generative social science is “to provide initial mi-
crospecifications (initial agents, environments, and rules) that are sufficient
to generate the macrostructures of interest” and thus they “consider a given
macrostructure to be ‘explained’ by a given microspecification when the lat-
ter’s generative sufficiency has been established” (1996, p.177). As noted
above, it can be argued that this formulation takes insufficient account of
underdetermination, but that does not detract from the point that explana-
tion requires that the macrostructures of interest (e.g. social institutions or
other population-level outcomes) must not have been programmed into the
computer simulation at the outset, since were that the case then the model
would simply describe a known outcome. As Costopoulos (2009, p.273) puts
it, the explanatory power of a generative model lies in the fact that it “must
be observed in operation to find out whether it will produce a predicted
outcome”.
While the power of generative modelling is widely acknowledged among
simulation-using archaeologists (e.g. Beekman 2005; Costopoulos 2009; Kohler
2000; Premo 2008), its use does raise a practical problem of system-bounding
if one is to avoid infinite regress. Thus, for example, Beekman (2005, p.66)
has proposed that “the only rules that should be fixed within a simulation
should be the most basic biological imperatives common to all humans, while
any Giddensian structural rules and resources must emerge through agents’
actions”. While this may be appropriate if the purpose of the simulation
is specifically to study how society ‘works’ (the context in which Beekman
made this suggestion), it is less clear that one really needs to simulate the
construction of the self and person sensu Simmel (see Scaff 2011, pp.213–225
and Archer 2000) in order to study, say, the effect of population size on the
maintenance of cultural complexity, or how foraging in a patchy environ-
ment promotes food-sharing. Even sociologists who reject the ontological
reality of social institutions accept that for practical purposes it may be
necessary “to assume certain background conditions which are not reduced
to their micro dimensions” (King 1999, p.223). It is important to recog-
nise, however, that under these circumstances one can not claim that the
model in any way explains the assumed macro-level properties. Thus, for
example, although Lake’s (2000) model of Mesolithic foraging was one of the
relatively few early archaeological agent-based models which explicitly in-
corporated ‘social’ behaviour above the level of the basic agent (in this case
collective decision-making by groups of family units), the model sought only
to explain spatial outcomes of that decision-making, not the emergence or
manner of the decision-making itself (see also commentary in O’Sullivan and
Haklay 2000, p.1419). Ultimately, as Kohler and van der Leeuw remind us
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“A good model is not a universal scientific truth but fits some portion of the
real world reasonably well, in certain respects and for some specific purpose”
(2007b, p.3). Consequently, a pragmatic stance is that what matters is not
whether a model is maximally generative, but whether it is generative with
respect to its purpose, that is to say, it must incorporate agent–agent and
agent–environment interaction relevant to its scale and it must be necessary
to run the model in order to find out whether the particular phenomena of
interest emerges.
4.3 Explanatory power trades complexity against fit
The issue of what is included in a model raises the question of whether
models should be as simple as possible, or more ‘lifelike’. As Levins (1966)
long ago noted in the context of population modelling, it is in practice
impossible to simultaneously maximise the generality, realism, and precision
of models of complex systems. For some, this implies that choices must be
made according to the intended scope and purpose of the model (Kohler and
van der Leeuw 2007b, pp.7–8), whereas others see a strong presumption in
favour of simplicity (Premo 2008, p.48).
There are three main arguments in favour of simplicity (which are not
mutually exclusive). The first and most basic argument is that replicating a
complex world by means of a complex model is unlikely to lead to enhanced
understanding since the latter is achieved by reducing complexity to “intelli-
gible dimensions” (Wobst 1974, p.151). In other words, explanation requires
reduction, although whether that is more due to the limitations of the hu-
man intellect than it is a reflection of the way the world is has long been
debated (see discussion on this point in Laird 1919, pp.342–4). Either way,
Collard and Slingerland argue that in practice both scientists and humanists
reduce, since “any truly interesting explanation of a given phenomenon is
interesting precisely because it involves reduction of some sort—tracing cau-
sation from higher to lower levels or uncovering hidden causal relationships
at the same level” (2012, location 311); indeed, they go so far as to suggest
that “when someone fails to reduce we rightly dismiss their work as trivial,
superficial, or uninformative” (ibid., location 314).
Not unrelated is the second argument in favour of simplicity: the ap-
plication of the law of parsimony, which posits that one should adopt the
simplest explanation for the observed facts. Indeed, one of the most impor-
tant insights from complexity science is the discovery that complex macro-
level patterns do not necessarily require complex behaviour on the part of
individual agents. As noted earlier, this has lead to enthusiasm for null
modelling (Premo 2007), in which one starts by investigating how much of
the observed phenomenon can be explained by the simplest possible model.
Although it could be argued that complexity science adopts an ontological
stance in favour of the notion that complexity is generated by the interac-
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tion of agents which individually exhibit relatively simple behaviour, null
modelling can also be viewed as an epistemic move favouring the gradual
addition of complexity to models to establish if doing so allows them to
explain more of the patterning in the observed data (Premo 2007, p.34).
Thus, for example, while Bentley and Ormerod argue “that the most appro-
priate ‘null model’ of individual behavior in larger societies is in fact. . . the
‘zero-intelligence’ model” (2012, pp.205–6), they also write at length about
what needs to be added to a null model based on statistical physics precisely
because human interactions are different. This may seem obvious, but the
point of modelling “from the null-up” (Premo 2007, p.34) is to avoid making
assumptions about complexity in favour of discovering how much complex-
ity is necessary to explain the observed phenomenon. Kohler et al. (2012a,
p.40) make a very similar point in relation to the use of optimizing models
when they state that they “do not. . . want to predetermine the answer to
fundamental questions such as, ‘do societies operate so as to optimize the
actions of their members?’–since these are questions we would like to ask”.
The third argument in favour of simplicity is the argument from gen-
erality (e.g. Costopoulos 2009, p.275): that simpler models which have not
been finely honed to fit a particular case, but can account for more—and
more diverse—cases have greater explanatory power, not least because they
allow one to predict what should happen in a wider range of circumstances
and so obtain a greater sense of the likelihood of the observed phenomenon
occurring rather than some other phenomenon. As Pinker forcefully argues,
explanation requires more than “saying something just is”: it consists in
demonstrating “why it had to be that way as opposed to some other way it
could have been” (Pinker 2002, p.72, my emphasis).
Although there are strong arguments in favour of keeping models simple,
a common view among philosophers of science is that “the best model for a
given data set is one which balances order and randomness by minimizing
the model’s size while simultaneously minimizing the ‘amount of apparent
randomness’ ” on the grounds that such a model ensures that “causes [are
not] multiplied beyond necessity while also obtaining a good prediction”
(Crutchfield 2008, p.274). In ecological modelling it is increasingly argued
that the best way to find this “optimal zone of model complexity” is to
build models that are structured to reproduce multiple real-world patterns,
not least because it is thought that such models are usually less sensitive
to parameter uncertainty (Grimm et al. 2005, p.989; also Piou et al. 2009).
This approach may also be profitable in archaeology (Altaweel et al. 2010),
but it is not unreasonable so suppose that the optimal balance between
model size and fit may vary within a discipline which encompasses such
wide-ranging subject-matter studied at a variety of spatial and temporal
scales. For instance, minimizing apparent randomness may be important in
a model designed to investigate whether Mesolithic land-use patterns on a
small Scottish island reflect the exploitation of specific resources (Lake 2000),
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but on the other hand a more appropriate ambition for an archaeology of the
very long-term might be whether there is an “‘envelope of predictability’ for
major socio-environmental changes, within which specific events and timings
remain unpredictable?” (Cornell et al. 2010, p.427). Ultimately then, it may
be that models of varying simplicity and fit can be productive providing they
meet two conditions: i) they are generative with respect to the problem at
hand; and ii) they adopt an exploratory experimental design in order to
elucidate other ways the explanandum could have been. In practice, such
models are likely to be those at the simpler end of the spectrum, but this
need not always be so.
5 Summary
Archaeologists have experimented with computer simulation for almost as
long as they have used computers and even some of the earliest simulation
models have features in common with contemporary agent-based models.
Nevertheless, there has been an explosion of interest in agent-based simu-
lation modelling since 2000, driven by its conceptual flexibility and acces-
sibility, the appearance of relatively ‘user-friendly’ software and interest in
the wider agenda of complexity science. Indeed it can be argued that the
technique has now achieved a degree of maturity: its use in certain sub-
disciplines (e.g. evolutionary archaeology) is becoming literally unremark-
able, such that papers increasingly focus on results and their implications
for substantive problems rather than methodological issues. Even so, there
is scope for greater consideration of what is required to maximise the po-
tential of learning by simulation, particularly with regard to experimental
design: ensuring that results are not ‘built in’ and achieving an appropri-
ate balance between model complexity and the fit to data. Furthermore,
there remain questions about what ontological baggage, if any, comes with
the adoption of agent-based modelling. Many, if not most, archaeological
agent-based models adopt a fairly strong methodological individualism and
concomitantly weak notion of emergence. Is this why, or because, most ar-
chaeological agent-based models deal with small-scale societies? Is it just
sensible scientific scepticism of mysterious downward causal forces, or is it a
narrow-minded and premature closing down of the possibility of a scientific
account of long-term social change? At present the answer is far from clear,
but intelligent application of agent-based modelling to a more diverse range
of problems will surely help to tease out what is required for satisfactory
explanation of aspects of human history.
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